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I. INTRODUCTION
Q: “Who done it? Where? And with what Weapon?”1
A: I suggest the crime was committed by the assistant, Alexa,2 in the
Study, with her Always-On Technology.3
In a scenario similar to the infamous game of Clue®, Alexa or the other
assistants could either be the detective or the culprit—or both.4 This
principle is illustrated by Susan Allen in her comment entitled Privacy in the
Twenty-First Century Smart Home:
The existence and purpose of the Echo may seem innocuous enough as it
serves as a personal in-home assistant meant to increase its user’s
convenience, yet it is vital to recall that unlike a human assistant that goes
home at the end of every shift, the Echo is always listening.5

For those not yet well-acquainted with the assistants, Alexa and her
friends—Siri, Cortana, Google, Bixby, and Moto (Voice)6—can be
summoned from various devices such as cell phones or smart home
speakers7 and have valuable uses beyond playing music or giving the user
1. PARKER BROTHERS, CLUE INSTRUCTION BOOK 3 (2005), https://www.fgbradleys.
com/rules/Clue.pdf [https://perma.cc/ATF3-2T39].
2. The Amazon Echo (Echo) or its respective assistant, Alexa, may be referred to individually
throughout this Comment, but the statements and suggestions contained herein apply to virtual,
personal, or digital assistants as a whole. See generally Maurice E. Stucke & Ariel Ezrachi, How Digital
Assistants Can Harm Our Economy, Privacy, and Democracy, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239 (2017)
(discussing the implications of the various digital assistants). They may also be referred to collectively
as “assistants” or denoted colloquially with gendered pronouns.
3. Cf. PARKER BROTHERS, supra note 1, at 5 (instructing how to suggest the manner by which
the crime was committed in gameplay, such as: “I suggest the crime was committed in the Lounge by
Mr. Green with the Wrench.”).
4. See generally id.
5. Susan Allen, Comment, Privacy in the Twenty-First Century Smart Home, 19 J. HIGH TECH. L.
162, 176 (2018) (emphasis added).
6. See Stacey Gray, Always On: Privacy Implications of Microphone-Enabled Devices, FUTURE OF
PRIVACY F. 1, 6 (2016), https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/FPF_Always_On_WP.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VGC8-SHL3] (providing information regarding the speech activation of the various
assistants and discussing the resulting implications); Bob O’Donnell, Keeping Track of All These Voice
Assistants Is Becoming a Problem, FAST COMPANY (July 10, 2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/
40437293/so-many-digital-assistants [https://perma.cc/8L46-UG7N] (introducing several of the
assistants and how they operate).
7. See Robert D. Lang & Lenore E. Benessere, Alexa, Siri, Bixby, Google’s Assistant, and Cortana
Testifying in Court, 89 N.Y. ST. B.J. 8, 9 (2017) (“Although ‘speech recognition’ may sound like a lofty
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today’s weather.8 For instance, they can make calls from the device itself
once the user’s phone is connected to the service,9 quickly provide accurate
answers to fairly complex mathematical questions,10 keep track of attorneys’
billable hours,11 store patient or client information,12 and more.13
However convenient, the assistants have recently started making waves in

term, it simply refers to what most of us do daily, when we use our voices to ask our phones to dial
our friends, our cars for directions, and our speakers to play our favorite songs. Speech recognition is
‘the ability to speak naturally and contextually with a computer system in order to execute commands
or dictate language.’ Technology rivals are hard at work creating irresistible versions of easy-to-use
devices with which we can talk and have questions answered.”) (footnote omitted).
8. See Jason Beahm & Cameron Bowman, Alexa, Are You a Snitch?, 36 NO. 3 GPSOLO 56, 57
(2019) (describing the benefits of smart devices and the virtual assistants within them); Lang &
Benessere, supra note 7, at 10 (“For most people, their virtual assistants’ ability to always be listening
for their ‘wake words’ is helpful. When we are driving, this allows us to complete tasks hands-free,
avoiding distractions, as well as moving violations. While we are making breakfast in the morning,
contemplating getting to work or to court on time, we can ask Alexa how long the morning commute
will take. Alexa also allows us to use voice commands to turn on the light while walking into a dark
room, without having to search for the light switch.”)
9. See Jeffrey Allen, Digital Virtual Assistants: Utility vs. Privacy, 36 GPSOLO 4, 4 (2019) (describing
a study of the fifteen most popular tasks performed by virtual assistants; although placing phone calls
was absent from the list, the author notes he has noticed more people using their virtual assistant to
place calls in the home, office, and car).
10. See Erika Rawes, Amazon Alexa Is Great. But What If She Could Do More?, DIGIT.
TRENDS (Feb. 25, 2018, 5:00 PM), https://www.digitaltrends.com/home/what-if-alexa-could-domore/ [https://perma.cc/P8NH-8SEU] (“Alexa does have tools that can solve problems like basic
arithmetic equations, quadratic equations, and logarithms.”).
11. See Sharon D. Nelson & John W. Simek, Are Alexa and Her Friends Safe to Use in Your Law
Office? The Pros and Cons of Personal Assistants, 61 RES GESTAE 41, 41 (2018) (noting virtual assistants
can assist attorneys with recording their billable time); Whitney L. Hosey, Comment, Alexa, Transmit
Client Data to Amazon: Ethical Considerations for Attorneys Looking Forward to Virtual Assistants, 19 WAKE
FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 51, 56 (2018) (describing the process by which attorneys may track
billable hours with Alexa). But see id. (“[T]here are many risks associated with this technology as well,
including the ability to create unique profiles on individuals, and store information which can
potentially be leveraged against them in a legal proceeding.”).
12. See Steven Oberman, The Ethical Use of Technology: Protecting You and Your Clients,
43 CHAMPION 18, 18–19 (2019) (describing the necessity of protecting client information when it is
stored digitally); Robert Humphreys, How the Changes in Technology Are Shaping the Law and the Legal
Profession in America, 30 REGENT U. L. REV. 371, 389 (2017) (noting the relatively new ability to store
client information in digital formats such as “the cloud,” discussed infra Section II, and the risks
associated with the same).
13. See Nelson & Simek, supra note 11, at 42 (describing other simple tasks virtual assistants are
able to perform for the attorneys, thereby increasing efficiency in the workplace, including “adding
entries to calendars, setting reminders, calling people in your contacts, [and] getting directions”).
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the legal community14 due to the aforementioned privacy issues that arise
from utilizing them for some of these seemingly innocent tasks.15
As admittedly vital as it is to keep these privacy issues in mind,16 it is
presumed many do not know the extent of Alexa’s listening and recording
capabilities.17 If people are aware of the eavesdropping nature, it is likely
they do not constantly consider it,18 or they trust the receiver of the data to
use it responsibly.19 Prior to writing this Comment, the author rarely
contemplated the ramifications of having multiple smart devices in her
home and on her person at any given time. Similarly, others have expressed
their lack of knowledge regarding the assistants’ reach and how to overcome
these unknowns.20 For instance, Jeffrey Allen21 commented:

14. See Lang & Benessere, supra note 7, at 10–12 (describing advantages and disadvantages of
virtual assistants’ use in the courtroom); Tom Mighell, The Modern Personal Digital Assistant, 42 L. PRAC.
30, 31 (2016) (admonishing not to “say anything to one of [the personal assistants] that you [do not]
want discovered in the future”).
15. Digital Virtual Assistants, supra note 9, at 4 (providing a list of the fifteen most common tasks
requested of a virtual assistant).
16. See Allen, supra note 5, at 176 (encouraging keeping the privacy risks surrounding the virtual
assistant in mind).
17. See Allison S. Bohm et al., Privacy and Liberty in an Always-on, Always-Listening World,
19 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2017) (referencing a surprising 2015 privacy policy released by
Samsung that “sparked the ire of [many] privacy advocates” when it stated: “Please be aware that if
your spoken words include personal or other sensitive information, that information will be among the
data capture . . . and transmitted to a third party through your use of Voice Recognition.”); Daniel J.
Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 494 (2006) (“In many instances, people are not
directly aware that they are being observed.”); Digital Virtual Assistants, supra note 9, at 5 (drawing
attention to a societal lack of awareness of the abilities of virtual assistants and available procedural
safeguards).
18. Cf. Solove, supra note 17, at 495 (“In fact, there can be an even greater chilling effect when
people are generally aware of the possibility of surveillance, but are never sure if they are being watched
at any particular moment.”).
19. See Bohm et al., supra note 17, at 5 (“You are vaguely aware that [the recorded voice data] . . .
is stored on corporate servers, but you are not sure what information is stored, and you trust the
company not to abuse it.”).
20. Rani Molla, People Say They Care About Privacy but They Continue to Buy Devices that Can Spy on
Them, VOX (May 13, 2019, 5:40 PM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/5/13/18547235/trustsmart-devices-privacy-security [https://perma.cc/XK3Y-6MMV] (“Even people who are tech savvy
have a difficult time finding and understanding this information,” according to an internet technology
program manager. He also described a situation where a friend of his, well-versed in technology, “was
‘tearing her hair out trying to find a baby monitor that was good for security and privacy.’”).
21. Jeffrey Allen is the principal in an Oakland, California law firm, Graves & Allen. He is also
Editor-in-Chief of GPSolo magazine, and he frequently speaks on technology topics. Digital Virtual
Assistants, supra note 9, at 4.
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I cannot help but wonder what percentage of the customers even know that
Amazon made the recordings, let alone that they have the ability to delete the
recordings. I am fairly aware of things going on in the technological world.
While I have known for some time that Amazon made the recordings and
reviewed them, I did not know about deleting them until the release of the
response [by Amazon] to [an inquiry by] Senator Coons [regarding Alexa’s
privacy practices].22

However, awareness regarding the reach of digital assistants is on the
rise—and concerns are growing.23 In a 2019 study by Microsoft, surveying
7,000 people, 72% reported using one of the aforementioned assistants via
a smart device or through their vehicle.24 Among those who reported using
a digital assistant, “41% . . . reported concerns around trust, privacy and
passive listening.”25 The other 59% should probably be concerned too.26
According to a Bloomberg article entitled Amazon Workers Are Listening to
What You Tell Alexa, these concerns motivate millions not to allow smart
home devices into their homes based on the fear the companies are
listening.27 Despite the rapid permeation of virtual assistants,28 many users
may not be aware of the plethora of legal, evidentiary, security, and privacy
issues arising from (1) active and passive listening, (2) subsequent recording
by the assistants, and (3) similar emerging technologies.29

22. Id. at 5.
23. See Katherine E. Tapp, Note, Smart Devices Won’t Be “Smart” Until Society Demands an
Expectation of Privacy, 56 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 83, 90–91 (2017) (discussing “the proliferation of
personal smart devices” and the dilemma borne from “[t]he tension between technology and privacy”);
Christi Olson & Kelli Kemery, Voice Report from Answers to Action: Customer Adoption of Voice Technology
and Digital Assistants, MICROSOFT VOICE REP. 3, 23 (2019), https://advertiseonbing-blob.
azureedge.net/blob/bingads/media/insight/whitepapers/2019/04%20apr/voice-report/bingads_20
19_voicereport.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9SY-YTVF] (“Lack of trust is a significant factor hindering
usage of smart speakers and digital assistants.”).
24. See Olson & Kemery, supra note 23, at 8 (discussing the rising prevalence of digital
assistants).
25. See id. at 6 (providing statistics regarding consumer distrust of digital assistants).
26. See discussion infra Sections II–IV.
27. See Matt Day et al., Amazon Workers Are Listening to What You Tell Alexa,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 10, 2019, 5:34 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-10/isanyone-listening-to-you-on-alexa-a-global-team-reviews-audio
[https://perma.cc/QWC9-XYC4]
(describing “[t]he Alexa voice review process”).
28. Olson & Kemery, supra note 23, at 10 (declaring the majority of people have now “used
voice search and voice commands through a digital assistant”).
29. Devices such as drones, webcams, Nest Cam, Kapture, OrCam, and keystroke recording
software may have similar ramifications. Gray, supra note 6, at 6.
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This Comment explores some of these issues and offers two suggestions
in an attempt to prevent the assistants from going too far and disclosing
otherwise protected speech:
(1) Extend the protection of the existing privileges to the virtual
assistants—allowing holders and claimants of existing privileges to
block virtual assistants’ disclosure of privileged conversations, so the
assistants may not, in essence, testify against a person regarding
speech which would normally be protected;30 and
(2) Create a so-called “Castle” Privilege31—essentially protecting private
utterances made in the presence of virtual assistants except in
circumstances where a warrant was lawfully and reasonably obtained
based on probable cause32—ensuring people feel comfortable in
their own homes, where they would ordinarily have a legitimate
expectation of privacy.33
II. BACKGROUND
Understandably, one of the issues which makes some people wary of
virtual assistants is the privacy policies—or lack thereof—surrounding the
waking procedure.34 Each voice-activated assistant typically has an assigned
wake word or phrase35—the utterance of which is intended to indicate the
user would like the assistant to start listening and respond accordingly36—
however, some of the assistants allow their owners to choose the word or
phrase.37 Although this can be a very convenient means of using the

30. See discussion infra Section IV.
31. See discussion infra Section IV.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
33. See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding persons may have a
reasonable expectation of privacy not only in their homes, but also in other areas—such as telephone
booths—wherein there is a justifiable reliance on privacy).
34. See Raphael Davidian, Alexa and Third Parties’ Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 54 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. ONLINE 58, 58 (2017) (discussing privacy implications connected to the waking of the
assistants).
35. See Gray, supra note 6, at 6 (providing the assigned wake words of the speech activated
assistants).
36. See id. at 5 (describing the ability of “speech activated devices . . . to remain in an inert state
of passive processing, or ‘listening,’ for a pre-set ‘wake phrase’”).
37. See id. at 6 (discussing “wake phrases” of the various assistants).
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assistant,38 the technology surrounding waking the assistant is neither as
simple, nor as full-proof as one might imagine—and has serious privacy
implications.39
In order for the assistants to be summoned upon hearing the wake word
or phrase, the devices must always be listening and are therefore sometimes
referred to as “always-on” devices.40 As noted by Amazon, Alexa begins
recording a fraction of a second prior to the utterance of the wake word and
begins transmitting it41 to “the cloud.”42 Therefore, the Echo series of
devices are always recording and just, hopefully, stop transmission to the
cloud and delete the unintentional data compilation once the more advanced
“cloud verification” denies detection of the wake word.43
Amazon has recently gone a step further, though, and filed a patent
application which would allow Alexa to process commands prior to a wake
word in order for users to interact more naturally with the device.44 For
example, the current command structure required to have an Echo device
tell a joke is, “Alexa, tell me a joke,” whereas under the new patent, one

38. See Beahm & Bowman, supra note 8, at 57 (balancing the convenience of the personal
assistants and the associated privacy implications); Lenore Benessere & Robert D. Lang, The Rise and
Danger of Virtual Assistants in the Workplace, BUS. L. TODAY (Feb. 15, 2018), https://businesslaw
today.org/2018/02/the-rise-and-danger-of-virtual-assistants-in-the-workplace/ [https://perma.cc/U
7VG-88MT] [hereinafter Rise and Danger of Virtual Assistants] (discussing the convenient nature of voiceactivated personal assistants); Allen, supra note 5, at 176 (emphasizing the fact that increased
convenience is the intended purpose of digital assistants).
39. See discussion infra Sections II–III.
40. See Grace Manning, Alexa: Can You Keep a Secret? The Third-Party Doctrine in the Age of the
Smart Home, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. ONLINE 25, 25 (2019) (“We rely on Alexa in our houses, and her
always-on microphone to make life easier.”); Steven I. Friedland, Drinking from the Fire Hose: How Massive
Self-Surveillance from the Internet of Things Is Changing the Face of Privacy, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 891, 905–07
(2017) (discussing surveillance implications of the “Always-On Devices”).
41. See generally Alexa and Alexa Device FAQs, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/
customer/display.html?nodeId=201602230&pop-up=1 [https://perma.cc/FC9Z-7CTB] (providing
answers to frequently asked questions regarding the Alexa series of devices).
42. “Cloud storage is a cloud computing model that stores data on the Internet through a cloud
computing provider who manages and operates data storage as a service.” Cloud Storage, AMAZON,
https://aws.amazon.com/what-is-cloud-storage/ [https://perma.cc/DJ7X-AS25].
43. See Alexa and Alexa Device FAQs, supra note 41 (discussing the Amazon cloud verification
process); Gray, supra note 6, at 6 (“Until [the devices detect a key word], they remain in an inert state
of buffering and re-recording, allowing the microphone to passively ‘listen’ for a key word without
recording or transmitting information.”).
44. See Pre-Wakeword Speech Processing, U.S. Patent No. 16/256376 (filed Jan. 24, 2019)
(issued May 23, 2019) (publishing the patent application by Amazon for pre-wakeword speech
processing).
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could say, “tell me a joke, Alexa,” and achieve the same results.45 Based on
the way the inventors describe the programming behind the audio retention
and processing within this proposed system,46 this plan would allow
Amazon to retain significantly more recorded data.47 Although this is a
novel advancement, devices utilizing similarly constant and pervasive
recording and retention technologies have historically evoked suspicion and
criticism in the courts.48
Communications uttered around a smart device assistant are less secure
if the assistant is set to wake via voice command, as mentioned above, as it
can wake inadvertently.49 For instance, communications around the
Amazon Echo are not highly secure since the Echo is voice-activated and
therefore records conversations in error when the assistant incorrectly
perceives a wake word.50 If a person says, “I was following a Lexus,” a
45. See id. (describing Amazon’s new “computer-implemented method for processing a spoken
command when the wakeword does not begin the command”).
46. See id. (“When the system detects a wakeword within a particular utterance, the system
determines the most recent utterance change location prior to the wakeword and sends the audio from
that location to the end of the command utterance to a server for further speech processing.”).
47. Joseph Mandour, Amazon Alexa Patent Will Record Even Before Wake Word, MANDOUR &
ASSOCS. (May 30, 2019), https://www.mandourlaw.com/blog/amazon-alexa-patent-will-record-even
-before-wake-word/ [https://perma.cc/2DWX-KSXQ].
48. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 395 (2014) (distinguishing the search of cell phones
from physical records due to the inherent “element of pervasiveness”); People v. Majstoric,
No. C082728, 2019 WL 5688702, at *1, 1 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2019) (holding a criminal defendant
was not required to submit his technological devices for “search and seizure . . . any time of the day or
night” after he accepted probation). In Majstoric, the court held such a condition was a violation of the
defendant’s constitutional rights, statutes, case law, and the privilege against self-incrimination.
Supporting its conclusion, it quoted the Supreme Court of California, which had reasoned in another
recent case:
If we were to find this record sufficient to sustain the probation condition at issue, it is difficult
to conceive of any case in which a comparable condition could not be imposed, especially given
the constant and pervasive use of electronic devices and social media by juveniles today. In
virtually every case, one could hypothesize that monitoring a probationer’s electronic devices and
social media might deter or prevent future criminal conduct.
In re Ricardo P., 446 P.3d 747, 754 (Cal. 2019).
49. See Peggy Wojkowski, Alexa, Am I Violating Legal Ethics?, KENT L. (May 31, 2017),
http://blogs.kentlaw.iit.edu/islat/2017/05/31/alexa-violating-legal-ethics [https://perma.cc/F2U64R6H] (discussing the ramifications of virtual assistants that wake via voice command); Gordon K.
Eng, The Potential of New Digital Assistants for Office Use, 40 L.A. L. 34, 35 (2017) (examining unintentional
waking of the assistants).
50. See Eric Boughman et al., “Alexa, Do You Have Rights?”: Legal Issues Posed by Voice-Controlled
Devices and the Data They Create, BUS. L. TODAY, July 2017, at 2 (discussing accidental engagement of
the assistant), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2017/07/05_
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nearby Echo device will likely wake due to misunderstanding “a Lexu--” as
“Alexa.”51 If the individual were looking straight at the device and paying
attention, they would see a blue circle light up on the device,52 could
command Alexa to stop,53 or could even delve into their device’s history to
delete the inadvertent recording.54 However, privacy concerns multiply if
the person does not notice it has started recording as Alexa, by default, does
not announce when she begins recording,55 although users may enable the
“start of request” sound.56 Nevertheless, communications around devices
that are set to wake by a method other than a wake word or phrase, such as
pressing or holding a button, are considered more secure.57 Although
virtual assistants can similarly be unintentionally triggered via accidentally
holding down the button,58 this happens far less often than by inadvertent
boughman/ [https://perma.cc/EWD3-MJKX]; Manning, supra note 40, at 28 (describing a situation
in which a murder occurred “and law enforcement hoped [Alexa] was accidentally triggered to record
the events”).
51. See Davidian, supra note 34, at 58 (providing an example of how the assistants may be woken
inadvertently).
52. See id. at 59–60 (illustrating how Alexa notifies the user the interaction is being recorded).
But see Craig Lloyd, How to Make Your Amazon Echo Play a Sound When You Say “Alexa”, HOW-TO GEEK
(June 20, 2017, 4:53 PM), https://www.howtogeek.com/297966/how-to-make-your-amazon-echoplay-a-sound-when-you-say-alexa/ [https://perma.cc/PN8S-AC59] (“[I]f your Echo isn’t someplace
where you can see it easily, enabling the audio tones is a great way to make sure that Alexa heard you
[or did not] without guessing.”).
53. See Commands | The Living List., THE ASSISTANT (2019), https://theassistant.io/commands/
alexa/ [https://perma.cc/84UE-53EV] (providing an extensive list of commands to which Alexa
responds).
54. In an Amazon FAQs section, What about “false wakes”? , Amazon acknowledges and
addresses these inadvertent wake scenarios. They state a solution to this issue is to “review and delete
the voice recordings associated with your account (including any audio resulting from a false wake) in
your Voice History available in the Alexa app.” Alexa and Alexa Device FAQs, supra note 41.
55. See David Flint, Who’s Listening to You?, 38 BUS. L. REV. 70, 70 (2017) (illustrating privacy
implications by virtual assistants generally).
56. See Alexa and Alexa Device FAQs, supra note 41 (describing how to enable “wake up” sounds
either through the Alexa app or by voice request); Lloyd, supra note 52 (informing users this is not a
universal feature and the setting will need to be adjusted for all Alexa devices).
57. For instance, iPhone users can choose to change their Siri settings to wake “her” by holding
down the home button or holding down the power button, depending on the phone model, rather
than by using the wake phrase. See Digital Virtual Assistants, supra note 9, at 6 (implying users may feel
more comfortable enabling Siri to wake by pressing a button). Similarly, the newer Amazon Tap is
more secure than its Echo counterparts as the user must touch the button to activate the microphone,
meaning it is not listening constantly for the wake word or phrase, and the likelihood of inadvertently
waking the device is less. See Wojkowski, supra note 49 (discussing features of the Amazon Tap).
58. See Candid Wueest, Everything You Need to Know About the Security of Voice-Activated Smart
Speakers, SYMANTEC: THREAT INTEL. (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.symantec.com/blogs/
threat-intelligence/security-voice-activated-smart-speakers [https://perma.cc/UE3A-LRAX]; see also
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voice activation. Additionally, the user has greater control over the data
since the virtual assistant is not listening until the press of the button.59
If the smart device does not have an option to summon the assistant via
pressing a button, the voice-activated device’s security can be increased
slightly by requiring the device to respond to certain voices, or at least
limiting access to certain data depending on the user.60 Some of the
assistants respond to voices other than that of the purchaser, some respond
to specified voice patterns and intonations, and some will respond to any
voice by the default setting.61
III. CONCERNS
A. Privacy Rights Under the Fourth Amendment
We live in a world of diminishing privacy. Walls and doors once protected
our personal secrets from governments as well as nosy neighbors. Today, our
hyper cyber-connected life has created ocean-sized data flows, a potent
information marketplace, and public revelation of personal and even intimate
secrets, some usually reserved in the past only for individual diaries or
discussions behind closed doors. If a person lives “on the grid,” her intimate
and valued information sooner or later likely will be subject to access to third
parties . . . . Significantly, big chunks of this information can end up in
government hands, to be stored indefinitely and used without oversight.62

Gordon Eng, Evaluating the Use of Digital Voice Recorders for the Law Office, 26 L.A. L. 70, 70–71 (2003)
(detailing similar issues that arose when users of digital voice recorders accidentally pressed buttons).
59. See Nelson & Simek, supra note 11, at 42 (explaining Samsung has opted to have Bixby
respond by pressing a button).
60. See id. (pointing out although “Alexa can distinguish voices for access to some data, it is”
still not as secure as it would be if it to require other access credentials); Anne Logsdon Smith, Alexa,
Who Owns My Pillow Talk? Contracting, Collateralizing, and Monetizing Consumer Privacy Through Voice-Captured
Personal Data, 27 CATH. U. J.L. & TECH. 187, 191–94 (2018) (discussing the possibility to create specific
voice profiles, thereby increasing security over certain personal account data).
61. See Nelson & Simek, supra note 11, at 42 (describing some virtual assistants’ abilities to
differentiate between users’ voices); see Smith, supra note 60, at 191 (“Google and Amazon have enabled
their devices to distinguish between multiple users and associate their voice with their own personal
account.”).
62. Friedland, supra note 40, at 892. Anne Pfeifle, Comment, Alexa, What Should We Do About
Privacy? Protecting Privacy for Users of Voice-Activated Devices, 93 WASH. L. REV. 421, 437 (2018) (“To keep
pace with quickly changing technology, experts, scholars, and privacy advocates have proposed a
number of solutions to protect users’ privacy.”); Allen Fiechuk, Comment, The Use of AI Assistants in
the Courtroom and Overcoming Privacy Concerns, 28 WIDENER COMMONWEALTH L. REV. 135, 149–56
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With emerging technologies on the rise in recent years, the right to
privacy is the talk of the town like a new trend in this month’s edition of
Cosmo©, but its roots run deep and can be traced back hundreds of years.63
In a famous English case, Sir Edward Coke stated: “[T]he house of every
one is to him as his . . . castle and fortress, as well for his defence against
injury and violence, as for his repose . . . .”64
Even more renowned on this side of the pond, the Fourth Amendment
to the Constitution reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.65

Although the entire Fourth Amendment is comprised of one fifty-fourword sentence,66 courts are still trying to sift through the words in an
attempt to discern how much protection the amendment provides, and to
whom it provides, even those agreed upon protections.67 The Framers did
not provide us much guidance in analyzing these very important words.68
As there are no explicit definitions or limitations helpfully appended to the
text, constitutional interpretation is therefore left up to lawyers, lay-persons,
judges, and justices alike.69 Thousands of hours have been devoted to the
(2019) (“The court has recently begun to struggle with how AI fits in with a person’s right to privacy,
but as this technology is relatively new, the case law is almost non-existent.”).
63. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV (prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures).
64. Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1604).
65. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
66. Id.
67. See Jeffrey Bellin, Fourth Amendment Textualism, 118 MICH. L. REV. 233, 233 (2019)
(attempting to find solutions for “the Fourth Amendment ‘search’ conundrums that continue to
beguile the Court”); Trevor Burrus & James Knight, Katz Nipped and Katz Cradled: Carpenter and the
Evolving Fourth Amendment, 2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 79, 79, 82 (2017–2018) (discussing “the Evolving
Fourth Amendment” and the need “to help delineate when the Fourth Amendment has been
triggered”).
68. See Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers’ Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth Amendment,
86 IND. L.J. 979, 979–80 (2011) (suggesting the route to a meaningful interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment is through John Adams’s “knowledge of, and views on, search and seizure and his role in
formulating the principles to regulate those governmental actions” since he was the primary contributor
to the Amendment).
69. See Bellin, supra note 67, at 233 (“Unfortunately, no viable alternatives appear on the
horizon. The justices themselves offer little in the way of a replacement [to Fourth Amendment
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meaning of these words, and thousands of pages of discussion and debate
exist exploring the intricacies—and yet, it seems we are lifetimes away from
figuring it out under the best-case scenario.70
B. The Issue of Consent
One thing is fairly clear, though—the right to privacy is not absolute.71
Notwithstanding the above-listed issues,72 which are discussed further in
Section III,73 consent can also be an affirmative defense to a claim of
invasion of privacy.74 Consent is “[a] voluntary yielding to what another
proposes or desires; agreement, approval, or permission regarding some act
or purpose, esp[ecially] given voluntarily by a competent person; legally
effective assent.”75 Furthermore, consent may be express: clearly and
unmistakably stated by the individual76—or it may be implied: inferred from
the conduct of the individual.77
To further muddy the waters, the level of consent required for recordings
depends on the jurisdiction in question: in some states, all parties need to
consent to a recording, whereas federal law and a majority of states require
consent of only one party.78 In situations in which only one party’s consent
is required, some would purport that the owner or purchaser has consented

interpretation]. And scholars’ proposals exhibit the same complexity, subjectivity, and illegitimacy that
pervade the status quo.”) (emphasis omitted).
70. See Clancy, supra note 68, at 983 (“Historical analysis remains a fundamentally important
tool to interpret the words of the Fourth Amendment. Despite its crucial role, there is no consensus
regarding the details or meaning of the historical record.”). See generally Akhil Reed Amar,
Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 760 (1994) (criticizing the inconsistent
interpretations of the Fourth Amendment).
71. See Kenneth Einar Himma, Privacy Versus Security: Why Privacy Is Not an Absolute Value or
Right, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 857, 864 (2007) (asserting privacy rights are not absolute—specifically
mentioning the exceptions of security, “consent or some other legitimate authorization”).
72. See discussion, supra, Section III(A) (mentioning, briefly, the issues of Fourth Amendment
interpretation).
73. See discussion, supra, Section III(C) (delving into the varying interpretations of the
prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment).
74. Consent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
75. Id.
76. Express Consent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
77. Implied Consent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
78. See Jay Goldberg, A Little Known Hidden Problem Within the Federal Wiretap Statute, 14 NO. 9
WHITE-COLLAR CRIME REP. 1, 1 (2000) (discussing the Federal Wiretap Act and how consent
requirements for recording conversations vary).
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to the recording, but this is not a black and white matter.79 When would
consent occur, if it did at all? Would it be when a person buys the device,
when they accept it as a gift, when turning it on, by leaving the assistant
turned on or plugged in, when the assistant wakes, or if and when the person
notices that it wakes? Since there is no express agreement between the user
and the smart device and the duration of consent is not specified, the answer
to this question is far from clear.80
Another issue rears its ugly head when visitors to a location speak, and
Alexa records the speech, unbeknownst to them.81 It has been suggested
that third parties should enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in this
situation82—and hopefully courts agree. If courts were to rule that the third
parties have consented, there is a lot of grey area as to when that alleged
consent may have occurred.83 Considerations include, but are not limited
to: awareness of the presence of the device,84 awareness that the device is
listening,85 awareness that the device is recording and full understanding of
the specific recording procedures,86 awareness if the owner has their Alexa

79. See Supnick v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. C00-0221P, 2000 WL 1603820, at *2 (W.D. Wash.
Dec. 6, 2002) (“Because Amazon did not disclose the scope of the electronic interception, plaintiffs
assert that no one could have consented to the disclosure.”). See generally Wilcosky v. Amazon.com,
Inc., No. 2019CH07777, 2019 WL 2724009 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 27, 2019) (alleging Amazon violated
certain users’ privacy rights by collecting biometric data without written releases from Alexa users).
80. See Smith, supra note 60, at 205–08 (addressing some of the contractual consent dilemmas
surrounding virtual assistants).
81. See id. at 207 (differentiating visitors’ consent from that of purchasers).
82. See Davidian, supra note 34, at 63 (“Considering the Court’s willingness to find reasonable
expectations of privacy with regard to activity taking place within homes, unless and until Alexa
becomes customary and prevalent in homes, third parties without knowledge that Alexa was within
their vicinity should have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their conversations under the Fourth
Amendment.”) (footnote omitted).
83. See Bohm et al., supra note 17, at 19–20, 29 (providing hypotheticals illustrating the uncertain
nature of consent of third-party visitors); Davidian, supra note 34, at 61–62 (discussing consent issues
with the assistants).
84. See Bohm et al., supra note 17, at 19–20, 29 (stressing visitors to a home or business
containing a virtual assistant may not even be aware of its presence).
85. See id. at 16 (noting the smart “devices . . . are not marketed with sufficient information to
enable consumers to understand and develop reasonable expectations about how the devices
function—and when they are listening”).
86. See id. at 16, 19–20, 29 (emphasizing visitors’ potential lack of knowledge about virtual
assistants’ recording); Smith, supra note 60, at 207 (differentiating visitors’ consent from purchasers’
consent); Davidian, supra note 34, at 60 (hypothesizing there may be a day in the near future when all
visitors to a home will understand they may be recorded by the assistants).
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settings such that the recordings are sent to Amazon for quality control,87
whether the speaker activated the device intentionally,88 and whether the
speaker was a minor or had reached the age of majority.89
A class action was recently brought under the California Invasion of
Privacy Act “on behalf of a proposed class of ‘all citizens of the State of
California who used a household Amazon Alexa device while they were
minors, but who have not downloaded and installed the Alexa app.’”90 In
most cases,91 contractual agreements with minors are “voidable at the
option of the minor” even if the minor has expressly agreed to the
unspeakably long laundry lists of terms and conditions.92 So why should
they be bound to the chains of consent with recordings? They should not—
but we will see how this shakes out in the coming years, especially with the
recent innovation of the rainbow-ridden kids edition of the Echo Dot.93
C. Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
Among the ambiguous language in the Fourth Amendment is the phrase
“unreasonable searches and seizures.”94 Although it may initially seem
elementary, questions soon arise such as: what acts are deemed to be
unreasonable, what is a search, and what is a seizure?95 Black’s Law

87. See Blake A. Klinkner, Inviting the Spy into Your Office? Ethical Concerns Involving Attorney Use of
Digital Assistants, 41 WYO. L. 54, 54 (2018) (discussing complex questions surrounding digital assistants’
use in the legal field).
88. See Boughman et al., supra note 50, at 2 (discussing the potential for accidental engagement
of the assistant).
89. See Smith, supra note 60, at 218 (discussing potential violations of children’s privacy laws by
the virtual assistants).
90. R.A. v. Amazon.com, 406 F. Supp. 3d 827, 830 (C.D. Cal. 2019).
91. Exceptions exist, such as if “the minor . . . [fails to] disaffirm the entire contract within a
reasonable time of reaching the age of majority.” Juanda Lowder Daniel, Virtually Mature: Examining
the Policy of Minors’ Incapacity to Contract Through the Cyberscope, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 239, 244 (2007).
92. See id. at 244 (“Currently, most if not all jurisdictions allow a minor to disaffirm a contract
made while he was under the age of majority solely based on his status as a minor.”).
93. See generally Complaint, In re Request for Investigation of Amazon, Inc.’s Echo Dot Kids
Edition for Violating the Child.’s Online Priv. Prot. Act (Fed. Trade Comm’n 2019), https://www.
law.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Echo-Dot-Complaint-FINAL-1.pdf [https://
perma.cc/XT4K-8Y6H].
94. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
95. See Julia R. Shackleton, Alexa, Amazon Assistant or Government Informant?, 27 U. MIAMI BUS.
L. REV. 301, 310–11 (2019) (stating “[t]hroughout the course of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
the United States Supreme Court has varied in its interpretation of what the Fourth Amendment
protects”—providing examples from Justices Harlan’s focus on the “subjective expectation of privacy”
to Justices Taft’s and Scalia’s property or trespass-based notions of an unreasonable search).
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Dictionary defines “unreasonable” as: “1. Not guided by reason; irrational
or capricious. 2. Not supported by a valid exception to the warrant
requirement.”96 A “search,” as it pertains to criminal procedure, is “[a]n
examination of a person’s body, property, or other area that the person
would reasonably be expected to consider as private, conducted by a lawenforcement officer for the purpose of finding evidence of a crime.”97 The
definition98 also echoes the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause
requirement99 nested in the Warrants clause.100 Lastly, a “seizure” is “[t]he
act or an instance of taking possession of a person or property by legal right
or process; esp[ecially], in constitutional law, a confiscation or arrest that
may interfere with a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.”101
Although the government has historically had a reputation for being the
overreaching “Big Brother,”102 sometimes it is valuable to have the right
sort of big brother to look out for your interests.103 On June 30, 1965,
President Lyndon B. Johnson issued a memorandum addressing the
wiretapping of telephones and the resulting invasions of privacy—urging
these practices only be conducted in circumstances implicating a breach of
national security.104 What he went on to say was even more wise and
insightful, far ahead of his time, and echoes principles that should be
adhered to today regarding virtual assistants:
Utilization of . . . electronic devices to overhear non-telephone conversations
is an even more difficult problem, which raises substantial and unresolved
questions of [c]onstitutional interpretation. I desire that each agency
conducting such investigations . . . ascertain whether the agency’s practices are

96. Unreasonable, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
97. Search, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
98. Id.
99. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
100. See Warrant Clause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The clause of the Fourth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requiring that warrants be issued only on probable cause.”).
101. Seizure, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
102. See Kenneth Shuster, Stunting Big Brother’s Growth: Reflections on U.S. v. U.S. District Court,
18 HAMLINE L. REV. 64 (1994) (“[Reexamining] one of the most important Supreme Court cases to
address governmental electronic eavesdropping . . . .”).
103. See, e.g., Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies by
President Lyndon B. Johnson (June 30, 1965) (quoted in United States v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 424, 432
(C.D. Cal. 1971)).
104. Id.
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fully in accord with the law and with a decent regard for the rights of
others.105

Two years later, in the landmark case of Katz v. United States,106 the
Supreme Court held the defendant, Katz, was protected from the
warrantless eavesdropping by the government via a device placed outside
the phone booth he was using as Katz had “justifiably relied” upon the
privacy of the telephone booth.107
Shortly thereafter came Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, more commonly known as the Wiretap Act.108 The
Act prohibits unlawful seizure “of wire, oral, or electronic communications”
by governmental and private agencies or individuals.109 Although
“[e]lectronic surveillance [has been said to be] an essential law enforcement
tool,”110 the digital assistants are recording and transmitting data
unchecked, and therefore without probable cause.111 It follows, then, that
the limitations on how this collected data can be used must be at least as
stringent, if not more so, than the constitutional, statutory, and commonlaw restrictions regarding wiretapping.112
Although Facebook has been complying with state and federal requests
for Facebook users’ data for years,113 courts should find data from virtual
assistants distinguishable. Even when a person directly and intentionally
asks a virtual assistant a question, they do not have the same intent to
publish that information as those who post on Facebook, Twitter,
Instagram, and other forms of social media. In order “[f]or a conveyance

105. Id.
106. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
107. Id. at 353.
108. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511–23 (2018).
109. Id.
110. People v. Darling, 95 N.Y.2d 530, 535 (App. Div. 2000).
111. See Bohm et al., supra note 17, at 20–22 (arguing for the probable cause standard for access
to always-on device information as this is not currently occurring).
112. See 47 U.S.C. § 605 (providing federal limitations on wiretapping); Benanti v. United States,
355 U.S. 96, 101 (1957) (holding neither participation nor knowledge by federal agents is required in
order for the evidence obtained through wiretapping to be inadmissible in court); Lee v. Florida,
392 U.S. 378, 378, 381–82 (1968) (holding “continuous surreptitious surveillance and recording of all
conversations” without consent “clearly amounted to interception of the petitioners’ communications
within the meaning of § 605 of the Federal Communications Act”).
113. See, e.g., Heidi M. Silton & Courtney Blanchard, Social Media Discovery: The Ongoing Struggle to
“Update Status”, 69 BENCH & B. MINN. 16, 18 (2012) (providing information regarding Facebook’s
compliance policies with various types of subpoenas).
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to be made voluntarily, it must be done with intent or by design, which, of
course, presumes knowledge on the part of the consumer of that which is
being conveyed.”114 This level of awareness is not yet commonplace with
always-on devices.115
For this reason, the Florida Bar Association issued a Formal Ethics
Opinion creating a process to ensure compliance with their local ethics rules
regarding the use of smart devices and virtual assistants—the rationale
behind the opinion being “that many lawyers were ‘intentionally and
unintentionally stor[ing] their clients’ information on these [d]evices.’”116
If highly-educated professionals struggle with unintentional recordings and
data storage by the virtual assistants,117 one can safely assume the dilemma
does not stop there. Even more clearly deserving of protection, though, are
the individuals inadvertently recorded due to an error in voice recognition
by Alexa or her friends.118
Looking at recent case law regarding other digital intrusions can provide
guidance in this matter. For instance, in a case wherein the police discovered
a man, Kyllo, was growing marijuana indoors by aiming a thermal imager at
his residence, the Supreme Court held that any information obtained from
within the home that would ordinarily not have been accessible without
physical intrusion, or without technology that is not in general public use,
constituted a search.119 The Court reemphasized “that the Fourth
Amendment draws ‘a firm line at the entrance to the house’” when it
prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.120 In the 2014 case of Riley
v. California,121 two defendants were arrested and the digital contents of their
cell phones were searched.122 The Court deemed this was unconstitutional
114. Steven M. Bellovin et al., It’s Too Complicated: How the Internet Upends Katz, Smith, and
Electronic Surveillance Law, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 28 (2016) (footnote omitted).
115. See Bohm et al., supra note 17, at 5, 16, 19–20, 29 (“[I]t is often unclear to consumers what
kinds of data these [always-on] devices are collecting, when they are collecting that data, and what
companies are really doing with the data.”).
116. Hosey, supra note 11, at 63 (quoting Fla. B. Ethics Op. 10-2 (2010)).
117. See id. (describing the ethical hoops attorneys are navigating in the virtual assistant arena).
118. See discussion supra Section II.
119. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 27 (2001) (“Where, as here, the Government uses
a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of a private home that would previously
have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a Fourth Amendment ‘search,’
and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”).
120. Id. at 40 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)).
121. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
122. See id. at 378–81 (describing the arrests and subsequent searches and seizures of David
Riley and Brima Wurie in each of their respective cases).
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without a warrant.123 The Court reasoned that due to the colossal storage
capability of cell phones—often containing multiple years of sensitive
data—an invasion of this variety is much more severe than physical searches
of decades past.124 As the Court stated, “many of the more than 90% of
American adults who own cell phones keep on their person a digital record
of nearly every aspect of their lives.”125
Furthermore, in the 2011 case of Carpenter v. United States,126 the Court
arguably had excellent statutory reason to allow captured, warrantless
evidence, but saw the following facts as crucial in finding otherwise.127
After a series of robberies, several men were arrested in conjunction with
the same, and one of the men detained eventually disclosed they had robbed
many other locations and disclosed the names of his accomplices.128 Upon
obtaining this information, the court orders were sought—and granted—
under the Stored Communications Act to obtain cell phone records for the
accused.129 The Stored Communications Act allows the government to
compel certain communications records when there is reasonable cause to
show the records are relevant and probative in an ongoing criminal
investigation.130
The Court held the government obtaining the Defendant’s cell-site
location information (CSLI) violated his reasonable expectation of privacy,
despite having obtained the data from a third party under a court order.131
In doing so, it reasoned:
Given the unique nature of cell phone location records, the fact that the
information is held by a third party does not by itself overcome the user’s

123. See id. at 403 (“Our answer to the question of what police must do before searching a cell
phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.”).
124. See id. at 375 (noting, prior to “cell phones, a search of a person was limited by physical
realities and generally constituted only a narrow intrusion on privacy,” but that in the modern world, a
wealth of private information can be gathered from these devices).
125. Id.
126. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
127. See id. at 2211 (“This case presents the question whether the Government conducts a
search under the Fourth Amendment when it accesses historical cell phone records that provide a
comprehensive chronicle of the user’s past movements.”).
128. Id. at 2212.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See id. at 2219 (“In mechanically applying the third-party doctrine to this case, the
Government fails to appreciate that there are no comparable limitations on the revealing nature of
CSLI.”).
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claim to Fourth Amendment protection. Whether the Government employs
its own surveillance technology as in Jones or leverages the technology of a
wireless carrier, we hold that an individual maintains a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the record of his physical movements as captured through CSLI.
The location information obtained from Carpenter’s wireless carriers was the
product of a search.132

Although perhaps less obviously, the recording and repetition of speech
by the virtual assistants is akin to the listening and repetition of speech by
parrots.133 In both situations, an eavesdropper of sorts repeats back
information it overheard and was not expected to disclose. Courts have
refused to admit such instances of testimony by parrots—despite parrots
being regarded as highly reliable testimony from intelligent animals—for a
number of reasons. In one case, a parrot named Max repeatedly cried out,
“Richard, no, no, no!” after the murder of his owner, Jane Gill.134 The
defense attorney in the case wanted to have this evidence admitted because
his client’s name was Gary.135 The attorney said it was not hearsay, but
instead that it was akin to a recording device.136 However, the Judge denied
admission of the parrot’s statement, despite expert testimony that this type
of parrot has the ability to accurately repeat statements—especially in
similarly stressful circumstances.137
Similarly, Bud, the parrot, began incessantly repeating, “Don’t f***ing
shoot!” after the murder of Martin Duram by Glenna Duram.138 A parrot
from South Carolina comparably repeated, “help me, help me,” which had
132. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (stating, under exigent circumstances, CSLI data could
foreseeably be lawfully obtained without a warrant).
133. See Christopher Coble, Parrot Evidence Rule: Can Bird’s Testimony be Admissible in Court?,
FINDLAW (July 21, 2017, 3:57 PM), https://blogs.findlaw.com/legally_weird/2017/07/parrot-eviden
ce-rule-can-birds-testimony-be-admissible-in-court.html [https://perma.cc/KBE5-SVN7] (describing
two instances in which words uttered by a parrot aided, or came close to aiding, in criminal cases);
Parrot May Have the Answer to a Killing, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 1993), https://www.nytimes.com/
1993/11/12/news/parrot-may-have-the-answer-to-a-killing.html
[https://perma.cc/74H6-89RZ]
(detailing how a California parrot named Max repeated information implying the death of his owner
was unnatural); Tanya Roth, Parrot’s Comments Aid Cops in Elder Abuse Case, FINDLAW (Dec. 14, 2010,
6:15 AM), https://blogs.findlaw.com/blotter/2010/12/parrots-comments-aid-cops-in-elder-abusecase.html [https://perma.cc/J9AB-AKTZ] (“The case of a tattletale parrot may give police and
prosecutors some real leads in a real story of alleged elder abuse in South Carolina.”).
134. Parrot May Have the Answer to a Killing, supra note 133.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Coble, supra note 133.
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been cried out by its owner, Anne Copeland, prior to her death. Even more
heart-wrenchingly, the parrot also laughed, mimicking the laugh of Ms.
Copeland’s murderer.139 There has been a push by the Nonhuman Rights
Project for recognition of “certain ‘cognitively complex’ animals as ‘persons’
rather than ‘things.’”140 However, apparently their time has not come yet.
Given this fact, that cognitively complex animals are still recognized as
“things” and the recollections and resulting repetitions of “things” cannot
be submitted as evidence in a case,141 virtual assistants should not be any
exception to that rule.
Traveling back in time, the court in Dietemann v. Time142 hit the nail on
the head when it held that the defendant infringed upon Dietemann’s
privacy rights by obtaining and publishing information about, and
recordings of, the plaintiff without his consent.143 The court eloquently
reasoned:
Plaintiff’s den was a sphere from which he could reasonably expect to exclude
eavesdropping newsmen. He invited two of defendant’s employees to the
den. One who invites another to his home or office takes a risk that the visitor
may not be what he seems, and that the visitor may repeat all he hears and
observes when he leaves. But he does not and should not be required to take
the risk that what is heard and seen will be transmitted by photograph or
recording, or in our modern world, in full living color and hi-fi to the public
at large or to any segment of it that the visitor may select. A different rule
could have a most pernicious effect upon the dignity of man and it would
surely lead to guarded conversations and conduct where candor is most
valued, e.g., in the case of doctors and lawyers.144

D. The Smart “Home Away from Home”
Although many people tend to consider smart home devices as home
accessories, hence their name, these devices also are finding their place in
139. Roth, supra note 133.
140. Tanya Basu, Serious Question: Can a Parrot Act as a Witness in Court?, THE CUT
(Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.thecut.com/2016/03/serious-question-can-a-parrot-act-as-a-witnessin-court.html [https://perma.cc/YNN8-QFLV].
141. Id.
142. Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
143. See id. at 248 (stating a person does not waive their privacy rights by inviting someone into
their home).
144. Id. at 249.
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the professional world—including in law firms and doctors’ offices.145 As
the Dietemann court predicted,146 this further illustrates the need for the
above-mentioned privacy issues connected with virtual assistants to be
adequately addressed.147 Amazon has now developed Alexa for Business,
which allows the user to keep track of billable hours, inter alia.148
Additionally, Thompson Reuters has released its own Workplace
Assistant.149 However, with digital assistants on the rise, professionals will
have to consider the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and applicable
jurisdictional rules.150
E. Evidentiary Considerations
Some argue that digital assistants be used as so-called silent witnesses.151
The silent witness theory is one in which a human witness is not required to
substantiate an act occurred, but instead recordings specifically noted as
photographs or videotapes are admitted as substantive evidence and do not
require a sponsoring witness.152 Taking no specific qualms with the silent
witness doctrine generally, the digital assistants should not be included
145. See Beahm & Bowman, supra note 8, at 58 (discussing home and office use of the virtual
assistants); Rise and Danger of Virtual Assistants, supra note 38, at 1 (“Virtual assistants processing and
retaining your interactions in the Cloud raises privacy concerns and potentially creates a discoverable
and admissible record with each use.”); Robert D. Lang & Lenore E. Benessere, Virtual Assistants in the
Workplace: Real, Not Virtual Pitfalls and Privacy Concerns, 21 J. INTERNET L. 1, 4 (2018) [hereinafter Virtual
Assistants in the Workplace] (“Not surprisingly, as Alexa and other virtual assistants continue to increase
in popularity, we are beginning to see them in both homes and businesses. If a virtual assistant is a
luxury at home, then certainly, it is a necessity at work.”).
146. Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 249.
147. See discussion supra Sections II–IV.
148. See generally Alexa for Business, AMAZON WEB SERVS., https://aws.amazon.com/
alexaforbusiness/ [https://perma.cc/B7VH-A49A] (discussing various professional applications of
the Alexa for Business product). See Virtual Assistants in the Workplace, supra note 139, at 3–4 (discussing
the Alexa for Business platform); Wojkowski, supra note 49 (drawing attention to systems designed to
bring Alexa into the legal workplace).
149. See Wojkowski, supra note 49 (providing another example of a legal system which can be
utilized through Alexa).
150. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (laying guidelines
for attorney competence); id. R. 1.6 (establishing guidelines for confidentiality of information).
151. Alexa, Did He Do It? Smart Device Could be Witness in Suspicious Florida Death, GUARDIAN
(Nov. 1, 2019, 4:21 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/nov/01/alexa-florida-deathwitness-amazon-echo?CMP=share_btn_link [https://perma.cc/2EYB-NXWU] [hereinafter Alexa,
Did He Do It?].
152. See generally Tracy B. Farrell, Construction and Application of Silent Witness Theory, 116 A.L.R.5th
373 (2004) (discussing how most jurisdictions do not require significant foundation to successfully
illicit silent witness testimony).
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under this theory for several reasons: (1) their recordings and transcriptions
are not photographs or videotapes; (2) the digital assistants are so pervasive
in society at this point that they are practically unavoidable;153 and (3) the
activation or waking technology is far from perfect.154 Photographs and
videotapes are much more time-honored types of recorded evidence.
Therefore, it follows they should be more reliable than digital assistants.
Even if a court were to rule that they should be considered silent witnesses,
the privilege extension to the digital assistants155 should still apply to
confidential communications, but only to the extent permitted under the
applicable state and federal rules.
To illustrate, there is an investigation underway in Hallandale Beach,
Florida, wherein police believe recordings captured by Alexa may help them
get to the bottom of a woman’s death.156 Sylvia Galva Crespo and her
husband were arguing and, somehow, she was stabbed in the chest.157
Should the court find that Alexa’s recordings of the altercation, if any, are
admissible under a silent witness theory? The recordings would likely still
be admissible under the proposed privilege extension. Under the Florida
Evidence Code, there is a Husband-Wife Privilege codified as
Section 90.504.158 However, similar to the Texas Spousal Privilege rule,159
there is no privilege in a criminal proceeding where one of the spouses is
charged with committing a crime against the other spouse.160 Therefore,
although the privilege extension should be adopted as a general rule, the
communications would not be considered privileged on account of the
statutory exception.161
There are many other evidentiary issues to be considered including
whether, under the Federal Rules of Evidence and those of the applicable
153. See Christopher B. Burkett, Note, “I Call Alexa to the Stand”: The Privacy Implications of
Anthropomorphizing Virtual Assistants Accompanying Smart-Home Technology, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
1181, 1182 (2018) (discussing the pervasive nature of smart-home technology); Stucke & Ezrachi, supra
note 2, at 1286 (“The Court cited one 2013 poll where ‘nearly three-quarters of smartphone users
report being within five feet of their phones most of the time, with 12 percent admitting that they even
use their phones in the shower.’”) (citation omitted).
154. See discussion supra Section II.
155. See discussion infra Section IV.
156. See Alexa, Did He Do It?, supra note 151 (“Police in Florida are investigating whether they
have stumbled on a silent witness to a possible murder and are trying to get the truth from ‘her.’”).
157. See id. (putting forth the facts and the unknowns of the tragic Hallandale Beach case).
158. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.504 (West 2020).
159. TEX. R. EVID. 504.
160. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.504; TEX. R. EVID. 504(b)(1).
161. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.504 ; TEX. R. EVID. 504.
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state, the proffered evidence from the digital assistant would also (1) be
unfairly prejudicial;162 (2) be inadmissible hearsay;163 (3) not be able to be
properly authenticated;164 or (4) fail to satisfy the personal knowledge
requirement.165 Furthermore, the prosecution would have to lay the proper
foundation for the evidence, including: “the competency of the operator,
the fidelity of the recording equipment, the absence of material deletions,
additions, or alterations in the relevant portions of the recording, and the
identification of the relevant speakers.”166
F. The Privilege
Rule 501 of the Federal and Texas Rules of Evidence discuss legal
privileges in general.167 Federal Rule 501 was codified by Congress in order
to give deference to the courts as to what may be construed as legally
privileged communications.168 The current privileges recognized by Texas
and federal courts, either by statute, case law, or both, include: required
reports privileged,169 attorney-client privilege,170 physician-patient
privilege,171 psychotherapist/social worker-client privilege,172 spousal
confidential communication privilege,173 spousal testimonial privilege,174
clergyman-penitent privilege,175 political vote privilege,176 trade secrets

162. FED. R. EVID. 403; TEX. R. EVID. 403.
163. FED. R. EVID. 801; TEX. R. EVID. 801; FED. R. EVID. 803; TEX. R. EVID. 803; see David
A. Schlueter, Hearsay—When Machines Talk, 53 TEX. B.J. 1135 (1990) (discussing the hearsay
implications of machines).
164. FED. R. EVID. 901; TEX. R. EVID. 901.
165. FED. R. EVID. 602; TEX. R. EVID. 602.
166. See United States v. Biggins, 551 F.2d 64, 66 (5th Cir. 1977) (providing the foundation for
introducing sound recording evidence).
167. FED. R. EVID. 501; TEX. R. EVID. 501.
168. See David A. Schlueter, Do We Need a Parent-Child Privilege?, 2 CRIM. JUST. 10, 37 (1987)
(discussing legal arguments for and against creating new privileges).
169. TEX. R. EVID. 502.
170. FED. R. EVID. 502; TEX. R. EVID. 503.
171. TEX. R. EVID. 509.
172. TEX. R. EVID. 510.
173. TEX. R. EVID. 504(a).
174. TEX. R. EVID. 504(b).
175. TEX. R. EVID. 505.
176. TEX. R. EVID. 506.
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privilege,177 state secrets privilege,178 and confidential informant
privilege.179 Some jurisdictions have adopted other privileges, such as the
parent-child privilege.180
Some of the above-mentioned privacy implications were discussed in “I
Call Alexa to the Stand”: The Privacy Implications of Anthropomorphizing Virtual
Assistants Accompanying Smart-Home Technology.181 In a latter portion of the
Note, it is suggested courts (1) treat the digital assistants as “persons”182
and (2) create a new privilege for the digital assistants.183
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Although the suggestion of a personal assistant privilege184 is
understandable—and even tempting—a slightly different approach should
be taken for several reasons. First, despite the Court’s ability to honor new
privileges,185 it has been historically reluctant to do so.186 Creating new
privileges can result in a slippery slope and, for this reason, few have been
added beyond the original common-law privileges.187 No independent
privilege exists for accountants, but the attorney-client privilege has been
177. TEX. R. EVID. 507.
178. See generally Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., A.C. 624 (1942) (detailing the roots of the
state secrets privilege in England); see also United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1953) (establishing
a state secrets privilege in the United States).
179. TEX. R. EVID. 508.
180. See Maureen P. O’Sullivan, An Examination of the State and Federal Courts’ Treatment of the
Parent-Child Privilege, 39 CATH. LAW. 201, 202 (1999) (stating the majority of courts do not recognize a
parent-child privilege and detailing the various courts’ treatment of the privilege).
181. See generally Burkett, supra note 153, at 1181 (discussing privacy concerns surrounding
digital assistants).
182. See id. at 1206–10 (stating “[c]ourts have the capacity to define how to treat virtual assistant
technology and should extend the term ‘person’ to certain technologies that are subjected to
assignments of agency” and describing various approaches of accomplishing this via either commonlaw or statutory modification).
183. See id. at 1210–16 (suggesting solutions to privacy issues with digital assistants by offering
an extensive “privilege between man and machine”—whether under the “instrumental model” or
“the humanistic model”).
184. See id. at 1213 (noting an Alexa-user privilege is necessary to avoid “a chilling effect on
communications between these parties, thus defeating the relationship’s fundamental purpose.”).
185. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980) (“The Federal Rules of Evidence
acknowledge the authority of the federal courts to continue the evolutionary development of
testimonial privileges in federal criminal trials ‘governed by the principles of the common law as they
may be interpreted . . . in the light of reason and experience.’”).
186. See Schlueter, supra note 168, at 11 (explaining courts generally disfavor evidentiary
privileges “because they potentially block otherwise relevant evidence”).
187. See id. at 37 (weighing the arguments for and against various privileges).
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extended to accountants in some circumstances.188 If a personal assistant
privilege were to be created, we might soon have nanny, coworker, and best
friend privileges on the horizon. It may initially sound absurd at first read,
but it would not be a far stretch to see requests for such privileges emerge
if new privileges are created for various relationships.
There are a few ways in which to protect the sanctity of these
conversations made in the presence of a virtual assistant:
A. An Extension of the Existing Privileges
We should take steps to solve this problem by giving holders and
claimants of the respective, existing privileges with the ability to extend the
respective, existing privileges to the virtual assistants. The creators of smart
home devices have already posited the assistants can be an extension of the
user:
Home. It’s more than just four walls and a roof over your head. It’s where
you feel safest and most comfortable. But what if your home knew you as
well as you know it? What if it could recognize you, and anticipate your
needs? . . . What if your home became—in small ways, then big ones—an
extension of you?189

This recommendation seeks to prevent virtual assistants from effectively
“testifying” as to what was heard and recorded. This could either be
accomplished by the Court adopting this method of analysis at commonlaw, by the Rules regarding privilege to be updated individually to reflect the
same, or by the Rules Committee adding another Rule which would limit
the former by this new exception.
The basic premise of this proposal is neither unheard of nor
unprecedented.190 As mentioned, the attorney-client privilege has been
extended to accountants in some circumstances.191 Translators are
188. See generally United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961) (extending the attorneyclient privilege to accountants hired by the attorney or client under certain circumstances).
189. Ryan G. Bishop, Note, The Walls Have Ears . . . and Eyes . . . and Noses: Home Smart Devices
and the Fourth Amendment, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 667, 667 (2019) (quoting a portion of the Nest smart home
website which is no longer published).
190. See generally Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958) (reiterating the common-law rule
preventing spouses from testifying against one another); see also Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. 209, 223
(1839) (holding a wife could not testify against her husband even though he had died).
191. See Kovel, 296 F.2d at 922 (“Hence the presence of an accountant, whether hired by the
lawyer or by the client, while the client is relating a complicated tax story to the lawyer, ought not
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permitted to be present during privileged conversations without violating
the privilege,192 as are employees of attorneys and doctors193 under the
proper circumstances. For generations, husbands and wives were
prohibited from testifying against their respective spouses,194 they were
considered legally incompetent to do so.195 The common-law reasoning
was for the sake of “fostering the harmony and sanctity of the marriage
relationship.”196 After all—as romantically phrased by the Supreme Court
in Stein v. Bowman—marriage has long been considered “the best solace of
human existence.”197
In Trammel v. United States,198 the tides turned and spouses have since
been allowed to testify against one another if they so choose.199 The
reasoning behind this decision largely fell on the argument that the spousal
“relationship is almost certainly in disrepair [if one spouse would testify
against the other]; there is probably little in the way of marital harmony for
destroy the privilege, . . . the presence of the accountant is necessary, or at least highly useful, for the
effective consultation between the client and the lawyer which the privilege is designed to permit.”).
192. See id. at 921 (explaining several situations in which attorneys may have linguists present to
best assist a client).
193. See id. (“On the other hand, in contrast to the Tudor times when the privilege was first
recognized, . . . the complexities of modern existence prevent attorneys from effectively handling
clients’ affairs without the help of others; few lawyers could now practice without the assistance of
secretaries, file clerks, telephone operators, messengers, clerks not yet admitted to the bar, and aides of
other sorts. ‘The assistance of these agents being indispensable to his work and the communications
of the client being often necessarily committed to them by the attorney or by the client himself, the
privilege must include all the persons who act as the attorney’s agents.’” (quoting 8 Wigmore,
Evidence, § 2301; Annot., 53 A.L.R. 369 (1928))) (internal citation omitted).
194. Hawkins, 358 U.S. at 75.
195. See id. (“The common-law rule, accepted at an early date as controlling in this country, was
that husband and wife were incompetent as witnesses for or against each other.”); Stein, 38 U.S.
at 222–23 (“And it is conceived that this principle [of spousal incompetency to testify against one
another in court] does not merely afford protection to the husband and wife, which they are at liberty
to invoke or not, at their discretion, when the question is propounded; but it renders them incompetent
to disclose facts in evidence in violation of the rule. And it is well that the principle does not rest on
the discretion of the parties. If it did, in most instances it would afford no substantial protection to
persons uninstructed in their rights, and thrown off their guard and embarrassed by searching
interrogatories.”).
196. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980).
197. Stein, 38 U.S. at 223.
198. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 40.
199. See id. at 53 (“Accordingly, we conclude that the existing rule should be modified so that
the witness-spouse alone has a privilege to refuse to testify adversely; the witness may be neither
compelled to testify nor foreclosed from testifying. This modification—vesting the privilege in the
witness-spouse—furthers the important public interest in marital harmony without unduly burdening
legitimate law enforcement needs.”).
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the privilege to preserve.”200 However, this sad circumstance201 is not
applicable with regard to the above examples of testimony by the virtual
assistants. In the virtual assistant scenarios mentioned, the claimants and
holders of the various privileges do not seek to violate one another’s
confidence. So why should we allow six-inch tall towers or rectangular
prisms in our pockets to be forced to disclose these privileged
conversations? We should not. If individuals seek to uphold the privileges
granted them by common-law or the Texas and Federal Rules of Evidence,
Alexa should not stand in their way.
By taking this initiative, the Court could avoid creating a new privilege, as
is its preference,202 yet enable people engaging in otherwise privileged
speech to feel comfortable around smart speakers. This would promote
further technological advancement rather than fear of the same:
As Justice Brandeis explained in his famous dissent, the Court is obligated—
as “[s]ubtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become
available to the Government”—to ensure that the “progress of science” does
not erode Fourth Amendment protections.203

Undoubtedly, privacy is not absolute, as “the government is permitted to
limit that interest if it can demonstrate a compelling government interest
and that its means of limitation or intrusion are necessary and closely
tailored to meeting that interest.”204 However, privileged conversations,
such as pillow talk between spouses and confidential discussions between
attorneys and their clients or doctors and their patients, should not be at
risk.205
B. Creating a “Castle” Privilege?
Should the Court be open to the idea of creating a new privilege in
addition to prohibiting the virtual assistants from testifying as mentioned
200. Id. at 52.
201. See id. (noting the marriage was already in such a state of disrepair since Trammel’s wife
was willing to testify against him in exchange for lenient treatment).
202. See Schlueter, supra note 168, at 11 (stating “the general principle that evidentiary privileges
are generally disfavored”).
203. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (quoting Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 473–74 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
204. See Schlueter, supra note 168, at 13 (illuminating flaws in the syllogism adopted by
proponents of the parent-child privilege).
205. See discussion supra Section IV(A).
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above,206 the Court should create a so-called “castle” privilege. The
proposed title to this privilege was inspired by the following quote by
Sir Edward Coke: “every man’s house is his castle, and he ought to keep and
defend it at his peril; and if any one be robbed in his house, it shall be
esteemed his own default and negligence.”207
I propose this castle privilege would only protect recordings within the
home in circumstances where one has a legitimate expectation of privacy.
Specifically, it would not apply in the home if individuals other than one’s
spouse were present since one would have no legitimate expectation of
privacy under these circumstances. Circumstances in which the speech
would be protected by the castle privilege, were it to be adopted, would
include when the individual was at home, speaking aloud—whether to the
personal assistant intentionally or if the assistant was recording
unbeknownst to the individual.
This is likewise not unprecedented. Looking back at Kyllo v. United States,
any information obtained from within the home which would ordinarily not
have been accessible without physical intrusion, or without technology not
in general public use, constituted a search.208 Although many people now
have at least one virtual assistant,209 it is the smart device itself that is
available to the general public210—not the remote listening and recording,
or subsequent cloud transmission and cloud verification technologies. The
castle privilege would be consistent under Kyllo211 but would extend
explicitly to the virtual assistants.

206. See discussion supra Section IV(A).
207. Castle Doctrine, THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
208. See generally Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
209. See CHRISTI OLSON & KELLI KEMERY, MICROSOFT, VOICE REPORT FROM ANSWERS TO
ACTION: CUSTOMER ADOPTION OF VOICE TECHNOLOGY AND DIGITAL ASSISTANTS 14 (2019),
https://advertiseonbing-blob.azureedge.net/blob/bingads/media/insight/whitepapers/2019/04%20
apr/voice-report/bingads_2019_voicereport.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9SY-YTVF] (“Gartner predicts
that by 2020, 75% of households will have at least one smart speaker. By January 2019, we saw that
45% already now own a smart speaker. For many survey respondents, one was not enough. 41% of
respondents who own a smart speaker already have multiple speakers (2+)”) (footnote omitted).
210. See id. at 15 (reminding us it is important to remember “[t]his is just the beginning” and
even “voice and digital assistants are still in very early stages of adoption”).
211. See generally Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
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V. CONCLUSION
Therefore, the existing privileges should be extended to the digital
assistants—based on a lack of competency as was rooted in common law
for public policy reasons—and a “castle” privilege should exist in a person’s
home when she has a legitimate and reasonable expectation of privacy.212
The aforementioned issues are becoming ever more prevalent as digital
assistants are nearly unavoidable.213 A digital assistant could be lurking in
the pocket of someone you are talking to, in a business office you visit, or
in a conference room during a supposedly confidential proceeding.214 Given
the imperfection of the waking or activation technology, these devices may
be triggered inadvertently and send privileged and private conversations to
the cloud for review by Amazon workers if the setting is not disabled.215
For these reasons and more, current lack of protection and privacy in the
presence of the digital assistants is something we can no longer tolerate.
Their present ability to disclose privileged conversations216 is contrary to
the reasoning behind privileges in the state and Federal Rules of Evidence.
Even in the most severe criminal cases, compelling one spouse to testify
against the other is forbidden, with just a few exceptions,217 because it is
deemed to be in the interest of public policy to promote the institution of
marriage.218 Digital assistants should not have the ability, nor the privilege,
to disclose these privileged conversations.

212. See discussion supra Sections IV(A); see discussion supra Sections II(B).
213. See discussion supra Sections II–IV. See generally OLSON & KEMERY, supra note 209
(evaluating “customer adoption of voice technology and digital assistants”).
214. See generally Ian Samuel, The New Writs of Assistance, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2873, 2884–85
(2018) (illustrating how virtual assistants are becoming more widely used, both in the professional
world and in private use).
215. See Manage Your Alexa Privacy Settings, Manage Your Alexa Data, AMAZON (2019), https://
www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=GPGRYRZ494GDFPZ2 [https://per
ma.cc/5G37-KGAA] (instructing how to prevent Amazon employees’ manual review of recordings).
216. See Hosey, supra note 11, at 59 (“Assurances that information from privileged client
meetings will not be disclosed would be difficult to achieve with always-on technologies like Alexa or
Siri present.”).
217. See TEX. R. EVID. 504; Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. 209, 217 (1839) (“This rule is subject to
some exceptions, as when the husband commits an offence against the person of his wife.”).
218. See Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 78 (1958) (“Adverse testimony given in criminal
proceedings would, we think, be likely to destroy almost any marriage.”); Stein, 38 U.S. at 223
(forbidding a widow from testifying against her then-deceased husband).
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